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Environmental Disasters and Human Health
Consequences: A Year in Review
By Susan Johnson, Blythe Brauer, Samantha Bird, Andrea Abergel, Jon Davey, and Mary Strayhorne*

S

Introduction

everal domestic and international environmental disasters
yielded widespread adverse environmental health consequences in the past year. The following article examines
the causes, effects, and legal and political implications of four
recent major industrial catastrophes. First, the article reviews
a deadly industrial explosion resulting from improper chemical storage in rural Texas in April 2013. Next, we move across
the globe to a collapse of a textile factory in Bangladesh that
occurred just one week later, highlighting some of the adverse
consequences to globalization without proper government oversight. The article then focuses
on three events that raise public
health concerns as they relate
to drinking water. First, we
focus on the widespread contamination of a public drinking
water source in North Carolina
by a major energy producer.
Next, we review the ongoing
struggle to resolve the harmful implications of the West
Virginia chemical spill. Lastly,
we explore the increasing environmental and health effects of
natural gas exploration and hydraulic fracturing.
These cases demonstrate the direct impact that industrial
carelessness often has on human health and underscore the
importance of natural resource preservation and protection.
More than 1,000 people were killed and countless injured as a
result of these tragedies. While the long term effects remain to
be seen, the events of the last year demonstrate the increasing
need for environmental responsibility not only to preserve the
environment for its own sake but also to maintain and improve
public health.

The company that owned the plant, Adair Grains Inc., used
it to store chemicals and fertilizer for sale to farmers. The facility
stored substantial amounts of potentially explosive chemicals,
including ammonium nitrate.5 According to the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”), Adair Grains was in possession of
540,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate.6 Investigators from the
Texas Department of Insurance and the state Fire Marshall’s
Office concluded that the ammonium nitrate caused the explosion due to its high flammability.7 While the source of ignition
is unknown, anything from a faulty golf cart to an electrical
malfunction could easily have set the ammonium nitrate on fire.8
Ammonium nitrate is so
volatile that businesses with
supplies of the chemical are
stringently monitored. At the
time of the explosion, seven
state and federal agencies were
monitoring the West plant;9
however, inspectors had not
visited the plant since 2011,
when it was found in violation of safety protocol.10 The
Chairman of the U.S. Chemical
Safety Board, testifying in front of the U.S. Senate Environment
and Public Works Committee, conceded that the West plant was
lost in the “patchwork of U.S. safety standards and guidance.”11
In 2011, the U.S. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration fined Adair Grains $5,250 for not having a security plan in place at the West plant.12 In 2006, EPA responded to
a citizen’s complaint about an ammonia smell emanating from
the plant.13 They referred the situation to the Texas Commission
on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”). It took TCEQ eleven days
to respond, despite the fact that ammonia smell, particularly
from a fertilizer plant, is considered high priority.14 TCEQ ended
up fining the company $2,300 for failing to secure an air permit
authorization for their ammonium nitrate tanks.15 TCEQ would
normally be obligated to disclose these violations to the U.S.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”), but
it failed to do so because Adair assured the agency there was
no chance of an explosion even in “the worst case scenario.”16
OSHA had not inspected the plant since 1985.17
Agencies overseeing facilities like the West plant are
stretched very thin. It would take OSHA ninety years to inspect
each similarly situated facility in Texas alone.18 As a result, the

“It would take OSHA
ninety years to inspect
each similarly situated
facility in Texas alone.”

Disastrous Explosion at Texas Chemical Plant
At 7:30 pm on April 17, 2013, a fire broke out at the West
Chemical and Fertilizer Company plant in West, Texas, a town
of roughly 2,800 people located 75 miles south of Dallas. After
local firefighters arrived on the scene shortly before 8:00 pm, the
plant exploded.1 The explosion flattened all the buildings within
a five-block radius, including a nursing home and an intermediate school.2 The blast was so intense that the U.S. Geological
Survey registered it as a 2.1 magnitude earthquake.3 Over 200
people were injured and 15 were killed, most of whom were first
responders from the local fire department.4
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government relies on businesses to follow the law and take the
proper precautions to avoid disaster. Adair Grains had “ample
opportunity to know and follow the law” and knew the potential
consequences for failure to take the proper safety precautions.19
A post-explosion inspection by OSHA cited twenty-four violations at the facility and proposed $118,300 in fines for “exposing
workers to fire and explosion hazards of ammonium nitrate and
chemical burns and inhalation hazards from ammonia storage and servicing” as well as “unsafe handling of ammonium
nitrate” and “failing to have an emergency response plan and
appropriate fire extinguishers.”20
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
requires businesses to disclose information on large-scale explosive chemical storage.21 Though Adair Grains stored 1,350 times
the amount of ammonium nitrate that should trigger DHS oversight, it did not disclose information to DHS.22 The company
operated “willfully off the grid,” and DHS did not even know the
plant existed until after the explosion occurred.23
Several insurance companies brought the first lawsuit against
Adair Grains on behalf of individuals and businesses in West
that suffered injury and property damage just three days after the
explosion.24 The suit claimed the company was negligent in the
operation of its facility by “creating an unreasonably dangerous
condition which led to the fire and explosion.”25 Between April
and August 2013, thirteen other lawsuits were filed against Adair
Grains in the three district courts of the county.26
In June 2013 the city of West filed suit against Adair Grains
and CF Industries, the chemical company that supplied the
plant with two 100-ton shipments of ammonium nitrate weeks
before the explosion.27 Many of the other plaintiffs proceeded
to amend their suits and added CF Industries as a defendant.
The suits allege that CF Industries produces a safer product than
ammonium nitrate and is therefore aware of its dangers.28 The
city is seeking $17 million for negligence and product liability.29
Environmental law attorneys have expressed doubt that the
plaintiffs will prevail in the cases against CF Industries because
ammonium nitrate is used extensively throughout the country in
everything from fertilizer to first-aid icepacks.30 To argue that a
particular product is somehow defective to succeed with a products liability claim will therefore be extremely difficult.31
In October 2013, the 170th State District Court in Waco,
Texas, appointed a nine-member steering committee comprised
of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ lawyers to decide how to proceed
with the complex, multi-party litigation. The plaintiffs were split
into three groups: those who lost relatives, those who suffered
injuries, and those who suffered property damage.32 The case
is currently in the discovery phase, and attorneys estimate there
may be millions of documents to examine. The first trial date is
set for January 26, 2015, the others for later that year.33
Even if the plaintiffs are able to recover damages from Adair
Grains and CF Industries, it is unlikely this one incident will be
sufficient warning for other corporations to make costly adjustments to improve their chemical storage practices. Congress
has recognized that the security of these facilities cannot be left
to “chance or the good intentions of only the most responsible
38

companies.”34 The Department of Homeland Security has already
made plans to expedite the approval of security plans for thousands of chemical plants that have been backlogged for years. It
is imperative that all of the federal and state agencies that regulate these corporations coordinate to streamline the inspection
process and ensure no facility is overlooked.

The Collapse Heard around the World:
Why Negligent Officials in Bangladesh and
Big Fashion Houses Are Contributing to
Environmental Disasters and Death
On April 24, 2013, an eight story commercial building
named Rana Plaza collapsed in Savar, a sub-district of the
capital of Bangladesh.35 Over eleven hundred people died in the
collapse and over twenty-five hundred were injured.36 Over 48
hours after the building’s collapse, garment workers were still
pinned beneath tons of mangled metal and concrete. Rescue
crews struggled to save them, as desperate relatives clashed
with police. This event is considered the deadliest garment
factory accident and structural failure in history.37 The building, composed of separate garment factories employing about
5,000 people, also contained apartments, a bank, and several
other shops, some of which immediately closed after inspectors
discovered cracks in the building the day before the collapse.38
Despite warnings, managers ordered garment workers to return
the day following the discovery of the cracks,39 threatening to
withhold a month’s pay otherwise.
The lead architect of the building claims it was never meant
for factory-type production and work.40 Officials nonetheless
renewed licenses for the factories. While the number of factories
in Bangladesh has soared in recent years to over 240,000, there
are only 50 government inspectors who issue operating licenses
and monitor their safety.41 There are 3,500 licensed garment factories that employ more than 3 million workers, mostly women
from impoverished villages, who are paid as little as $30 per
month and endure unsafe working conditions.42
A top Labor Ministry official claims that Bangladeshi
authorities were negligent for allowing garment factories to
operate in such buildings and for allowing the few city officials
who issue licenses to do so without performing proper safety
checks.43 He further contends that Bangladeshi officials should
have been acting to ensure their buildings met international labor
standards. Some counter that the negligence extends beyond
Bangladesh and that international companies who purchase low
cost clothing from such factories should share some of the blame
for the dismal working conditions factory workers face.44
Such companies using factories in Bangladesh to produce
their goods include retail clothing companies like the United
Colors of Benetton, the Children’s Place, Mango, and Walmart.45
Bangladeshi officials submitted a plan after the collapse that
would establish an independent inspectorate to oversee all their
factories funded by contributions from the clothing companies,
but many companies rejected the proposal due to cost and legal
risk.46 While rejecting the proposal, Walmart stated it would
monitor the 279 factories it uses in Bangladesh and report the
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

results on their website.47 Walmart and other American companies promised to stop production if urgent safety problems were
uncovered, and factory owners and government authorities were
notified of the proposed improvements. Carrefour, Benetton,
Marks & Spencer, El Corte Inglés, H&M, and Inditex signed
on to the safety agreement.48 In addition to inspections, the plan
will help pay for safety upgrades.
The Bangladesh labor market remains relatively unstable,
however. With the new agreements in place, the conditions may
improve and injured workers may find relief but not to the extent
that most human rights activists demand, which include legally
binding contracts between Bangladesh and international companies that use their factories. Absent the legally binding contracts
with international companies, Bangladeshi officials will remain
alone in bearing legal responsibility for the wrongful deaths arising from apparent negligence and
greed. Bangladesh responded
to suits alleging negligence and
wrongful death by suspending
seven inspectors accused of
renewing the licenses of garment
factories in the building that collapsed and ordering the arrest
of the owner of the nine-storied
commercial building.49
The magnitude of human
loss associated with building collapses is considerable,
largely due to the inadequacies
of lax structural requirements
and management agencies in
Bangladesh and other developing countries. The quality of
the environment, both natural
and man-made, depends on
its management, control and
organization and therefore stricter environmental standards
are imperative. One of the aims of environmental management
moving forward should be to reduce or completely eliminate
the vulnerability of the environment to such disasters through
prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and capacity building to
prevent future man-made building collapses. The Bangladeshi
government should strive to review and tighten policy guidelines to make Bangladesh a safer environment for living and
working.

contaminated water into the Dan River, which serves as a drinking water source for several Virginia municipalities.51
The North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (“DENR”) initially determined that the ash dam basin
remained intact despite the leak, with most of the ash contained
in the pond.52 DENR worked with Duke Energy officials and the
U.S. EPA to control the spill and ascertain the leak’s potential
effects on human health. Authorities inserted a plug to stop the
flow of coal ash, which they subsequently had to replace after it
leaked an additional 1,000 gallons of wastewater into the river.53
Officials in affected areas such as Virginia Beach, Virginia, shut
off water supply originating with the contaminated waters and
relied instead on local resources.54
Federal prosecutors began a criminal investigation within a
week of the incident and shortly thereafter issued subpoenas to
DENR and Duke.55 Legal issues
surrounding Duke’s handling of
coal ash first arose in 2013 when
it became the subject of multiple
unrelated federal suits under
the Clean Water Act.56 DENR
effectively halted those suits
aimed at forcing Duke to clean
up its coal ash locations57 and
instead undertook enforcement
of the sites’ cleanup, asserting
minimal penalties against the
company and setting a low bar
for future state penalty assessments. Minimal regulation of
the coal ash pond allowed Duke
to continue its irresponsible
storage practice—overloading
its coal ash sites and thereby
increasing the risk of drinking
water contamination. At a press
conference a week after the spill was made public, Governor Pat
McCory, a former Duke employee with stock in the company,
denied influencing DENR’s intervention or having any communication with the company regarding its legal obligations.58
The third of the unrelated 2013 federal suits was pending at
the time of the incident in February 2014. In response, DENR
asked the state judge to stay the federal settlement while the
state conducted an investigation of the coal ash facilities in the
state, demonstrating active steps to correct the regulatory mishaps of the prior year.59 Investigators hoped to reveal how often
regulators inspected the coal ash sites, the extent of subsequent
enforcement actions, the identity of the key players, and whether
the relationship between DENR and Duke required more settlements for criminal violations.60
Looking forward, some coal combustion products companies have suggested amending the regulatory authority EPA
has over hazardous materials to include coal ash as a waste
regulated under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (“RCRA”).61 Additionally, there has been pressure on the

“Absent the legally
binding contracts with
international companies,
Bangladeshi officials will
remain alone in bearing
legal responsibility for
the wrongful deaths
arising from apparent
negligence and greed.”

Catastrophe in North Carolina:
What is in the Future for Coal Ash Waste?
In early 2014, North Carolina experienced the third largest coal ash spill in U.S. history. It began on February 2, when
a Duke Energy (“Duke”) security guard noticed an unusually
low coal ash pond.50 A subsequent investigation revealed that
a pipe at the bottom of the twenty-seven acre pond was spewing 50,000 to 82,000 tons of coal ash and 27 million gallons of
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Obama administration to start policing waste storage sites across
the nation.62 Currently, the federal government empowers the
states to regulate the waste sites, which results in inconsistent
regulation.63 EPA has set a December 14, 2014 deadline to
release a draft of regulatory revisions to RCRA to upgrade
coal ash disposal under Subtitle D as a non-hazardous waste.64
To complement the regulatory action, Congress is considering
amending RCRA to require states to enforce the federal nonhazardous waste standards.65
Criminal investigations related to the Duke site are still
underway after twenty subpoenas were sent to DENR.66 The state
agency has hired its own attorney to investigate Duke’s practices, and reported at least eight
subsequent violations since the
February spill.67 As the criminal
proceedings continue, the public
seeks answers and accountability.
Voters blame Duke and the state
government for not doing enough
to protect natural resources
from toxic chemicals.68 A poll
of North Carolinians revealed
that Democrats, Republicans,
and Independents all agree on
the need for leaders who are
willing to stand up to big oil
companies.69 More importantly,
North Carolinians voiced their
concerns about regulating coal
ash as a hazardous substance and
expressed a desire to move power
plants away from rivers and lakes to specifically designed landfills
for environmental safety.70

Officials lifted the ban on water use in most communities after
nine days but reinstituted it in some places on January 30.78
Three months after the spill, many residents continued to use
bottled water whenever possible, noting lingering licorice-type
odors.79
Government officials know little about MCHM’s environmental or health hazards, as federal chemical safety law is
largely a morass. The Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”)80
is the federal statute that primarily governs chemical safety,81
but it exempts MCHM and roughly 64,000 other chemicals from
safety testing.82
Because TSCA permits MCHM use and transport in
industrial capacities without
significant testing, industry and
government officials as well as
the general public were left without a modicum of information
on how to address the cleanup.83
Under TSCA, the EPA cannot
test MCHM to determine its risk
to health or the environment,
unless the agency shows the
chemical poses an unreasonable
risk.84 Such circular reasoning
significantly impedes thorough
testing. Further, EPA does not
oversee aboveground storage
tanks like those at issue in this
spill,85 and because the U.S.
Department of Transportation
does not regulate the transportation of MCHM, emergency response teams do not consider
MCHM hazardous.86 While the spill reinvigorated a stalled
Senate proposal to update TSCA,87 environmental groups are
largely opposed to the proposed measure because it does not go
far enough to protect the public’s health.88
Regardless of whether and to what extent Congress acts,
courts will play a key role in assuaging the spill’s effects as many
people adversely impacted by the spill will want recompense for
the damage Freedom Industries caused. But Freedom Industries
filed for bankruptcy on January 17, 2014, stymying attempts
to sue the company.89 While prosecutors are investigating their
options,90 it remains unclear how long it will take and to what
extent it may lead to criminal prosecution.
The spill’s aftermath illustrates why significant policy
changes regarding chemical safety are so hard to come by: the
great chasm between local and federal chemical regulatory
regimes, Congressional inability or unwillingness to act, and
a slow moving judicial process do not immediately provide
for clean water or safer MCHM and related chemical storage
practices.

“A poll of North
Carolinians revealed
that Democrats,
Republicans, and
Independents all agree
on the need for leaders
who are willing to stand
up to big oil companies.”

Questions Remain Over West Virginia
Chemical Spill
On January 9, 2014, approximately ten thousand gallons
of 4-methylcyclohexane methanol (“MCHM”) and polyglycol
ethers (“PPH”) spilled from a Freedom Industries container
into West Virginia’s Elk River.71 Approximately 300,000 people
in nine counties immediately lost access to running water.72
Though the government predicts no long-term health effects
from the exposure,73 at least 400 people sought medical treatment for nausea, vomiting, burning eyes, and rashes following
the spill.74 Months later, many Charleston-area residents were
still relying on bottled water and question the extent to which
Freedom Industries will be held accountable as the polluter.
After this event, similar questions linger over future spill prevention and industrial chemical testing requirements.
The leak occurred one and a half miles from Charleston’s
drinking water intake and treatment facility. 75 Freedom
Industries employees did not notice the spill until after residents
complained of a licorice smell the day of the spill. Initial mitigation efforts failed76 and MCHM subsequently overwhelmed the
water treatment facility’s filters, prompting a do-not-use order.77
40
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Latest Legal Developments in Natural Gas
Exploration Affecting Human Health
The current worldwide energy crisis and resulting eleventh hour rush to find viable alternative energy sources have
triggered the hasty implementation of natural gas technologies
with effects that have yet to be willingly revealed by natural gas
and oil companies. At present, the federal government is slow
to move on implementing federal regulations on hydraulic fracturing as a method for natural gas exploration and extraction.
Additionally, states and local
governments have been at odds
on whether to allow fracking
activities within their boundaries, leaving many local governments in forced submission to
state political agendas. The
legal landscape in state and
federal courts portrays a canvas
of nuisance and trespass claims
with a monolith of personal
injury claims surfacing on the
horizon. Several events over the
course of 2013 shaped the legal
landscape around natural gas
exploration and human health
in the United States, which
saw an array of new regulatory
schemes and litigation strategies by big business oil and gas
companies.
Contemporary natural
gas exploration employs the
hydraulic fracturing method,
or “fracking,”91 an old mining
method employed with a new purpose which has been exhaustively analogized to the famous 19th century American Gold
Rush in the west, where gold-seekers used hydraulic mining to
separate gold dust from detritus along California and AlaskanCanadian landscapes.92 Times have changed, but the big business approach has not.
The pursuit for the “new black gold” has barreled on with
little federal oversight, rising conflict between state and local
governments, and litigation settlement strategies by oil and gas
companies with strange and potentially sinister outcomes. The
federal government has been slow to respond to a need for regulatory controls of fracking activities leaving some states tangled
in an on-going preemption battle with local municipalities
within their jurisdictions.93 Conflicting court opinions and state
policies on energy exploration have frustrated local community
efforts to control fracking activity through zoning ordinances,
who must then submit themselves to oil and gas exploration with
no power to regulate.94
The past year saw some states taking a proactive posture with
the emergence of water contamination issues related to fracking operations. For instance, California and Illinois both passed

legislation to regulate fracking, both consisting of disclosure and
public notification requirements related to chemicals used in their
fracking operations.95 Although both states successfully passed
disclosure requirement laws, the Illinois Department of Natural
Resources faced criticism by environmental advocates for drafting regulations that fell short of the legislature’s statutory intent
by undermining the effect of the disclosure and flow-back water
requirements.96 Meanwhile, a Wyoming 2011 study on fracking and its effects on drinking water contamination led the U.S.
EPA to admit—after discontinuing its own study in deference
to the Wyoming efforts—that
fracking does “likely impact”
groundwater.97
Litigation and settlements
related to fracking activities
have typically concluded with
settlements or sudden dismissals by Plaintiffs when water
contamination by harmful
substances related to fracking
activities, a conspicuous aspect
at claim initiation, becomes a
nonissue.98 Truths appear to
be suppressed in the interest
of instant justice through an
age-old preemptive litigation
strategy, the conditional settlement. As a result, most fracking-related complaints remain
within the realm of common
law nuisance and trespass
theories, but some complainants have filed personal injury
claims alleging harms caused
by water contamination by
fracking-related harmful chemical bi-products.99
Many lawsuits originate with landowners claiming groundwater contamination caused by oil and gas and drilling companies’ operations near the landowner’s homes, many of which are
concentrated in states like Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, Ohio,
New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia.100 In 2013,
Ohio and Pennsylvania district court decisions held that the facts
and circumstances of two cases supported claims for negligence
liability in fracking.101 Ohio, the stage for recent controversy
referred to as “Frackgate,” has recently been the venue to Clean
Water Act enforcement where a former Youngstowne-based
wastewater company owner was charged under the Act’s criminal
provision for dumping and ordering another employee to dump
deep injection mud and brine into a sewer that feeds into the
Mahoning River watershed.102 Plaintiff litigation strategies seem
to be shifting gears toward establishing fracking as an “abnormally dangerous activity,” which if established would trigger
strict liability for negligence in some jurisdictions.103 Fracking
litigation has even implicated the Exxon-Mobil Corporate
Executive Officer, Rex Tillerson, who joined a lawsuit with his

“EPA does not oversee
aboveground storage
tanks like those at issue
in this spill, and because
the U.S. Department
of Transportation
does not regulate the
transportation of MCHM,
emergency response
teams do not consider
MCHM hazardous.”
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neighbors to prevent fracking near his home based on a nuisance
theory that fracking would cause a drop in property values.104
In light of the recent increase in fracking activity, slow federal
regulatory momentum, state and local conflicts, limited environmental impact studies, and litigation still in the early stages, it will

likely be a few years before the public will realize the full impact
of fracking activities on human health and the environment. The
trend of quick settlements by oil, gas, and drilling companies is
another element that will slow the illumination of the full picture
of fracking effects on human health.
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